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THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
by Isabelle Katz Pinzler"
I. INTRODUCTION
From Brown v. Board of Education' in 1954 through the 1960's
and, in some instances, into the 1970's and even the 1980's, civil rights
advocates had become accustomed to looking to the Supreme Court as the
major bulwark in the struggle for civil rights and women's rights. The last
decade, however, has seen the Court shift towards a more conservative
stance and changed this perception.2 Now, as Justice Blackmun observed,
"[olne wonders whether the majority still believes that ... discrimination
.. is a problem in our society, or even remembers that it ever was."3
In 1989, the Supreme Court dealt a series of crippling blows to the
statutory framework of established civil rights laws and, in the process, sent
the struggle for equality in the American workforce plummeting.4 The
Court's decisions reversed time-honored judicial precedents under two of
the most important laws that Congress has enacted to provide
opportunities that were historically denied to racial, ethnic and religious
minorities and women: § 1981' and title VII.6 The Court has shown that
it is no longer willing to protect civil rights with its former vigor; civil
rights advocates must look elsewhere. This search for a new protector of
civil rights in the federal government has forced advocates to turn to
Congress to play the new leadership role in this area. Congress, in turn,
has responded by taking on this leadership role and drafting legislation
'designed to counteract this dangerous trend by the Court and to shore up
the weakened statutory infrastructure of the Congress' civil rights
* Director, American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights Project. A.B. 1967,
Goucher College; J.D. 1970, Boston University School of Law. The author gratefully
acknowledges the assistance of Wade Henderson, Associate Director, American Civil
Liberties Union Washington Office, and Susan Damplo, Esq., in the research and
preparation of this article.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 109 S. Ct. 706 (1989).
3. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2136 (1989) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
4. See, e.g., Croson, 109 S. Ct. at 706; Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct.
2363 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
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legislation.7
II. THE CONGRESSIONAL ROLE
It is entirely appropriate and certainly within Congress' power to
correct erroneous readings of legislative intent by the Supreme Court.'
The interplay between Congress' legislation and constitutional
considerations is a traditional one. Historically it has always been within
the Supreme Court's power to overturn a statute found to be
unconstitutional.9 For example, a statute protecting minority interests
might conflict with fourteenth amendment notions of equal protection, and
the Court may act to bring the statute and the amendment into harmony.
However, the Court's recent anti-civil rights decisions, which the
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 is designed to correct, do not, for the
most part, involve interpretations of the Constitution." Thus, this
legislation involves little more than a congressional response to restrictive
judicial interpretations of federal statutes that are wholly within the
purview of Congress to enact and to modify." In the face of decisions
which deprive civil rights laws of their practical effectiveness, it is
necessary for Congress to revisit the enforcement practices which provided
for comprehensive coverage under the anti-discrimination laws.
Congress has corrected judicial misreading of the intent of civil
rights laws on previous occasions.12 Indeed there is a long and growing
tradition of congressional restoration of previously legislated civil rights."
Most recently, Congress rejected the Court's reasoning in Grove City
College v. Bell. 4 In Grove, the Court held that only the particular
program within an institution receiving federal financial assistance had to
7. See Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990); S. 2104,
101st Cong. 2d Sess. (1990) [hereinafter Civil Rights Act of 1990] (as introduced both the
Senate and House bills are textually the same).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III., §§ 1-2.
9. See Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137,177 (1803) ("It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
10. See Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989); Martin v.
Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)
(all involving interpretations of title VII and other civil rights legislation and not any
constitutional provisions).
11. See Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 2.
12. See infra notes 14-32 and accompanying text.
13. Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (codified
as at 20 U.S.C. § 1681) [hereinafter Civil Rights Restoration Act] (the law was passed over
a presidential veto).
14. 465 U.S. 555 (1984).
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comply with the civil rights laws while other programs within the same
institution which are not federally funded, and the institution as a whole,
did not have to comply.' In response to Grove, Congress passed the Civil
Rights Restoration Act of 198716 which mandated institution-wide
coverage of civil rights laws'
Another important example of congressional leadership in the area
of civil rights involved the decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert.'8
The majority in Gilbert held that an employer's health insurance policy,
which excluded pregnancy coverage, did not constitute discrimination based
on sex, although the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission had
promulgated regulations to the contrary. Once again Congress moved
to, in effect, overrule the Court's decision by passing the Pregnancy
Discrimination Act? The Act stated that discrimination on the basis of
sex included discrimination because of pregnancy, childbirth or related
conditions."1 In this instance all three branches of government had an
opportunity to act on an important social question, with the congressional
action being the final and decisive one.
Congress has also acted in the area of voting rights. In City of
Mobile, Alabama v. Bolden,' the Supreme Court held that an at large
election scheme which had deprived black voters of representation did not
violate the fifteenth and fourteenth amendments.' Two years later,
Congress explicitly amended the Voting Rights Act to cover the Bolden
fact pattern by enacting the Voting Rights Amendments of 1982.'2
In 1986, Congress acted to overturn two Supreme Court decisions
which were contrary to congressional intent in limiting the rights of the
15. Id. at 570-74.
16. See Civil Rights Restoration Act, supra note 13.
17. Id.
18. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
19. Id. at 140-46. The EEOC guidelines were not given deferential treatment by the
court because they were found to conflict with an earlier pronouncement by the agency.
Id. at 142.
20. Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, Pub. L No. 95-555,92 Stat. 2076 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e).
21. Id.
22. 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
23. Id. at 61-80. See also U.S. CoNsr. amends. XIV, XV.
24. Voting Rights Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 131 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la).
syrup. 1990]
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disabled.2 In Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,' the Court ruled that
money damages could not be awarded against a state agency which violated
§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.2 The Congress then amended
the 1973 act to ensure that injured parties could recover from state
agencies.28 Similarly, the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of
19862 overturned the holding in Smith v. Robinson,30 where the Court
held that the Education of the Handicapped Act had repealed by
implication rights created by earlier statutes.31 Congress' 1986 act
expressly reinstated these rights.32
As demonstrated by this line of Supreme Court cases and the
legislative responses to counteract them, it is clear that Congress not only
has the right, but that it has the responsibility to reverse the Court's
decisions which misread congressional intent so fundamentally. Many
members of Congress are attempting to do just that and at the writing of
this article a bill has been proposed which will effectively overturn the
Court's recent decisions and strengthen civil rights in general.33
III. THE PROPOSED CIVIL RIGHTS AcT OF 1990
The proposed Civil Rights Act of 19904 was introduced in early
February for several purposes. One purpose is that of reversing the five
recent Supreme Court decisions discussed herein as well as several
25. See The Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-506, 100 Stat.
1807 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-791i) [hereinafter Rehabilitation Act]; Handicapped
Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L No. 99-372,100 Stat. 796 (codified at 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400-1420) [hereinafter Handicapped Children's Protection Act]. For the cases that
Congress sought to correct, see Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985);
Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). See also supra notes 26-32.
26. 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
27. Id. at 245-47. See also Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat.
355 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 701-709, 720-724, 730-732, 740-741, 750, 760-764, 770-776,
780-787, 790-794).
28. See Rehabilitation Act, supra note 25.
29. Handicapped Children's Protection Act, supra note 25.
30. 468 U.S. 992 (1984).
31. Id. at 1020-21.
32. Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-372,100 Stat. 796
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1415).




others.35 The Act is also designed to ensure that sexual, religious and
ethnic discrimination can be remedied as fully as race discrimination under
the civil rights laws.3 Lastly, the Act has the purpose of sending a very
strong and hopefully unmistakable message to the Court; that the Congress
and the people whom it represents, have not forgotten that discrimination
has been, and still is, a major problem in our society and that they are
determined to preserve and strengthen the legal protections against it.
37
The major features of the bill are, for the most part, addressed to the
various cases which were handed down last year and which have been
discussed in detail earlier in this Symposium.' These features are, for the
most part, amendments of the Civil Rights Act of 19643' and are intended
to reverse, overturn or otherwise "fix" each of the Supreme Court's recent
anti-civil rights decisions.
A. The Wards Cove "Fix"
The centerpiece of the bill, is § 4 which is designed to overturn
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio. ° The plaintiffs in that case were
cannery workers at a salmon processing facility where minorities held most
unskilled positions while whites predominated in higher paid, skilled
positions.41  The plaintiffs challenged the defendant's employment
practices such as separate hiring channels, a policy of not promoting from
within, and segregated living and eating facilities as violative of title VII.4'
The Court held that the plaintiffs had failed to establish that the
employer's practices created a disparate impact adversely affecting
minorities.43 Effectively reversing eighteen years of case law beginning
35. Id. §§ 2(a)(1)-2(b)(1). The Act states that "in a series of recent decisions
addressing employment discrimination claims under Federal law, the Supreme Court cut
back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights protections.... [T]his Act
... respond[s] to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by restoring the civil rights
protections that were.., limited by those decisions .... " Id. See infra notes 40-130 and
accompanying text.
36. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 5.
37. Id. § 2.
38. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
39. Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1975
to 1975d, 2000a to 2000d-4, 2000e to 2000h-5 (1988)).
40. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
41. Id. at 2119.
42. Id. at 2120.
43. Id. at 2124-27.
Symp. 1990]
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with Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,44 the Wards Cove Court held that the
burden of proof never shifts to the employer in a disparate impact case.4'
Moreover, the Court held, for the first time, that the race or sex-based
effect of overall challenged practices could be ignored unless the plaintiff
could demonstrate the impact of each particular employment practice,
within the overall practice, on a protected class.'
These holdings severely undermine the likelihood of successful
challenges to employment practices that have an indisputable
discriminatory impact.47 In essence, the burden has shifted to the plaintiff
who must prove that an employer had no legitimate business reason for its
discriminatory practices. Moreover, the plaintiff must now sort through the
various components of hiring and promotion systems to determine precisely
the.component that caused the discrimination, even though employers have
better access than do plaintiffs to information needed to evaluate such
components. By instituting such a requirement, the Court prevents
employees from challenging employment systems that may have an adverse
impact only cumulatively.48 Closely related to that, plaintiffs may not now
be able to establish a prima facie case especially in the most egregious,
complex, and subtle selection systems, such as those utilized in Watson v.
Fort Worth Bank & Trust.49 Nor is it clearly defined in these decisions
whether a subjective selection process, without clearly identifiable
component parts, is a single employment practice or series of practices.
Section 4 of the bill is subtitled "Restoring the Burden of Proof in
44. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
45. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126. The Court states that "the employer carries the
burden of producing evidence of a business justification.... The burden of persuasion,
however, remains with the disparate impact plaintiff." Id. In Griggs the Court had
previously stated that "Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that
any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question."
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 (emphasis added). The Court has shifted from the meaning that
this puts the burden of persuasion on the disparate impact defendant to show business
necessity to merely a burden of production of any legitimate business purpose. Compare
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) with NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 404 (1983).
46. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2124-25. "As a general matter, a plaintiff must
demonstrate that it is the application of a specific or particular employment practice that
has created the disparate impact under attack.' Id. at 2124.
47. Id.
48. See generally id.
49. 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988). The employment practice in question was a promotion
system for which there were no formal guidelines. All promotions were based solely on
the subjective judgment of white supervisors who were found to discriminate on the basis
of race. Id. at 2779.
[Vol. Via
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Disparate Impact Cases"" and amends § 703 of title VII clarifying existing
law which prohibits facially neutral employment practices that have a
disparate impact on protected groups. 1 It provides that upon a prima
facie showing of disparate impact by the plaintiff, the burden of proof
shifts to the employer to prove business necessity. 2 Under this section
of the bill, as originally introduced and discussed at this symposium, a
practice could be justified as a business necessity if it is essential to
effective job performance." The bill underwent a number of revisions as
it made its way through Congress. One of the most important changes was
in the definition of business necessity. Under the bill which was reported
out of the Conference Committee there is a two prong definition: First, in
the case of employment practices involving selection, the practice or group
of practices must "bear a significant relationship to successful performance
of the job"; second, in the case of employment practices which do not
involve selection, the practice or group of practices must "bear a significant
relationship to a significant business goal of the employer."54 Section 4
further clarifies that if the plaintiff proves that a group of employment
practices causes a disparate impact, the plaintiff need not prove which
specific practices within the group caused the disparate impact.55
B. The Martin v. Wilks "Fix"
Section 6 of the bill is subtitled "Facilitating Prompt and Orderly
Resolution of Challenges to Employment Practices Implementing Litigated
or Consent Judgments or Orders"56 and amends § 703 of title VII to
address the issue of collateral attacks on judgment or consent orders.5 7
The provision prohibits, under certain circumstances, challenges to
employment practices which implement the terms of a judgment or consent




54. See CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 856, 101st Cong., 2d
Sess., § 3(o)(1)(A), (B) (1990) [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT]. This document
amended the House bill, H.R. 4000, and is to accompany S. 2104.
55. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 4. Subsequent additions make it clear
that an employer may demonstrate that a specific practice within a group of practices does
not have disparate impact and thereby be relieved of the burden of showing business
necessity as to that practice. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 54, § 4.
56. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 6.
57. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
Syrup. 1990]
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order resolving previous claims of discrimination."8 The provision does
not, however, affect the current law of intervention, the rights of parties
and class members or, where the government litigates in the public
interest, the rights of those persons on whose behalf relief is sought.5 9
Nor does the proposed bill affect such traditional collateral attack bases
as collusion or fraud.' Persons collaterally barred under the bill would
include those who had notice of the outcome of the previous proceedings
or consent order that might affect their interests, as long as these persons
had a reasonable opportunity to present objections. 1 Others who would
be barred are those whose interests were already adequately represented
in the proceedings, and those to whom the court determines reasonable
efforts were made, consistent with due process, to provide notice.'
Martin v. Wilks, 3 the case which prompted this section of the bill,
arose when white firefighters, who forewent the opportunity to object to
settlement decrees between black firefighters and the City of Birmingham,
Alabama, in a title VII suit, challenged these decrees in a separate
action." The two consent decrees set forth long term and interim annual
goals for hiring blacks as firefighters and also provided promotional goals
for blacks within the department.' The white firefighters claimed that
they had been denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks." The
city admitted that it had made race conscious personnel decisions, but
argued that it had acted lawfully in compliance with the consent decrees. 67
The Supreme Court, contrary to the predominant view of the circuit courts,
held that persons who were not parties to a court approved consent decree
may challenge its provisions in a separate action.6s The Court determined
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not bar collateral attack
unless the person has been joined as a party under Rule 19 and that Rule
24, which provides the procedure for intervention, does not mandate
intervention where an action implicates a person's rights.'
9
Martin jeopardizes judgment or consent orders resolving claimed
58. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 6.
59. Id.
60. Id. § 8.
61. Id. § 6.
62. Id.
63. 109 S. Ct. 2180 (1989).
64. Id. at 2183.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2182.
67. Id. at 2183.
68. Id. at 2184.
69. Id. at 2185-88.
[Vol. VII
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violations of title VII and discourages the use of settlements and consent
decrees as a means of resolving future disputes. If not overturned, Martin
would permit persons who sat on the sidelines while the case was being
litigated or settled to later challenge the result in separate proceedings.'
It would also permit continued re-litigation of the same issues and
objections of the previous litigation, depriving the parties to the judgment
or consent orders, of the stability to which they are entitled.71
The proposed language of § 6 of the proposed act remedies the
adverse consequences of Martin in the resolution of employment
discrimination disputes. By generally prohibiting collateral attacks, the
section imposes a certain standard for resolving discrimination disputes,
while specifying methods for the notification of nonparties and affording
them an opportunity to be heard.' The provision does not affect the
rights of parties or rights of intervention. 73 Moreover, under the bill,
collateral attack may be permissible for those who do not fall into any of
the three categories of § 6 or where the objection is founded on collusion
or fraud or other traditional grounds for collateral attack.74 Thus the due
process rights of parties and non-parties alike are fully protected.
C. The Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins "Fix"
Section 5 of the bill is subtitled "Clarifying Prohibition Against
Impermissible Consideration of Race, Color, Religion, Sex or National
Origin in Employment Practices."75 It amends § 703 Of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to provide that, as a general rule, it is a violation of title VII
for an employer to use race, ethnicity or gender as a motivating factor in
employment decisions.76 This provision addresses the implication of
recent Supreme Court opinions that federal laws may, under some
circumstances, tolerate discrimination and, instead, makes clear that actions
70. Id. at 2188 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2195-96 & n.21.
72. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 6.
73. Id.
74. Id. The three categories of persons prohibited from attacking a judgment or
consent order are: (1) persons who had notice of the previous litigation or had a
reasonable opportunity to present objections to the judgment or order; (2) persons whose
interests were adequately represented by another in the previous litigation; and (3) those
who were not adequately represented or apprised of the previous proceedings but
reasonable efforts were made to provide notice. Id.
75. Id. § 5.
76. Id. This section would amend 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988).
Syrup. 1990]
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in which discrimination is a motivating factor violate title VII."
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,' illustrates the Court's trend away
from full protection against discrimination. In that case, the plaintiff, a
female senior manager, sought partnership in a major, national accounting
firm. 79 Based upon her peer review evaluations, some of which praised
her for "outstanding professionalism" while others criticized her "macho"
and abrasive manner, her employer denied her a partnership.' She sued
alleging sex discrimination in violation of title VII.81 In analyzing the case
a plurality of four justices adopted a rule of causation which held that once
a plaintiff shows discrimination as a motivating factor, the employer must
prove, by a preponderance of evidence, that it would have made the same
decision absent that factor.Y Under this rule no violation occurs if an
employer can make such a showing.u
Section 5 of the proposed legislation directly addresses this
problem and provides that to redress a violation the courts may provide a
remedy under § 706(g), but that it shall not place individuals discriminated
against, or employers, in a better position regarding hiring, firing or
promotion than they would have been absent the impermissible motivating
factor.' The result of this language is that if an employer would have
discharged the individual for a permissible reason anyway, a court may not
order reinstatement of the individual.5
D. The Patterson v. McLean Credit Union "Fix"
Section 12 of the bill is designed to reverse Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union," and is subtitled "Restoring Prohibition Against All Racial
77. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 5.
78. 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989).
79. Id. at 1780-81 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
80. Id. at 1782. Still another evaluation of Ms. Hopkins stated that she should "walk
more femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make up, have her hair
styled, and wear jewelry." Id.
81. Id. at 1781.
82. Id. at 1780 (Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was joined by Marshall, Blackmun
and Stevens, JJ.). Justices White and O'Connor would have made the employer's burden
less stringent, but, nevertheless, concurred in the result. Id. at 1795-96 (White, J.,
concurring); id. at 1796 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83. See id. at 1795 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
84. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 5.
85. Id. § 5.
86. 109 S. Ct. 2363 (1989).
[Vol. VII
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Discrimination in the Making and Enforcement of Contracts."' This
section amends 42 U.S.C. § 1981, which prohibits racial discrimination in
the making and enforcing of contracts, to prohibit racial discrimination in
the making, performance, modification and termination of contracts,
including the enjoyment of all benefits, terms and conditions of the
contractual relationship.'
The Supreme Court's decision in Patterson created the impetus for
this provision. The case involved a suit by a black woman who alleged
that, because of her race, her employer had harassed her, refused to
promote her to an intermediate accounting clerk position, and then fired
her." The Court held that § 1981 did not prohibit a private employer
from racially harassing its employees. 9' The Court reasoned that the
defendant's harassment of the plaintiff and failure to promote her did not
interfere with her right to make and enforce contracts but rather interfered
only with her right of performance of the contract.9 The majority
opinion stated that the provision did not extend to problems of racial
discrimination during employment.' The majority reasoned that § 1981,
which applies only to the right to make and enforce contracts, was not
implicated because the time the contract was formed between employer
and employee is the date of hiring.93
In response to this restrictive interpretation, § 12 of the proposed
Act will restore the broad scope of § 1981." This will have the effect of
ensuring that individuals have equal treatment in employment contracts
regardless of race. An employer who discriminates based on race when
hiring is currently subject to liability for compensatory and punitive
damages under § 1981.9' Under § 12 of the proposed act, if that same
employer discriminates against employees because of their race after
hiring, he or she will now be liable for compensatory and punitive damages
87. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 12.
88. Id.
89. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2368-69.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 2373.
92. Id. at 2374.
93. Id.
94. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 12.
95. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975) The
Court stated that "it is well settled . . . that § 1981 affords a federal remedy against
discrimination in private employment on the basis of race. An individual who establishes
a cause of action under § 1981 is entitled to both equitable and legal relief, including
compensatory and, under certain circumstances, punitive damages." Id. at 459-60 (citations
omitted).
Syrup. 1990]
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as well." This will have the effect of reversing the Court's decision in
Patterson by including "performance, modification and termination of
contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms and
conditions of the contractual relationship,"97 in the definition of the right
to make and enforce contracts as provided by § 1981.
E. The Provision of Damages for Cases of Intentional
Discrimination
In the course of any discussions concerning the need to reverse the
Court's holding in Patterson, it quickly becomes clear that punitive damages
have never been available for forms of intentional discrimination other
than racial.98 Thus, no matter how egregious the sexual harassment a title
VII plaintiff may suffer, she is not, under current law, able to recover
anything other than injunctive relief and back pay, even if she prevails.99
Section 8 of the bill, which is subtitled "Providing for Damages in Cases of
Intentional Discrimination,"1" is designed to address that problem and to
provide equal remedies for all types of discrimination under title VII.V O'
It provides for compensatory and punitive damages in appropriate cases
and excludes these remedies for disparate impact violations and bars
punitive damages against governmental entities."° One of the significant
changes made in the bill during its progress through the two Houses was
the addition of a cap on the amount of punitive damages available under
it. The Conference version provides for a cap of $150,000 or an amount
equal to the sum of compensatory damages and equitable relief, whichever
is greater.'
As noted above, § 8 is specifically designed to address the anomaly
in fair employment law regarding damages. Currently, § 1981 includes
96. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 12.
97. Id.
98. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5g (1988) with 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Under § 1981 an
interference with the right to make and enforce contracts on the basis of race will result
in liability for compensatory and punitive damages and injunctive relief. See generally
Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975). However, under title VII,
which prohibits, inter alia, discrimination in employment on the basis of race and gender,
a claimant is entitled to full equitable relief but may only obtain back pay and is not
entitled to punitive damages. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
99. 42 U.S.C. § 20Oe-5(g).
100. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 8.
101. Id.
102. Id. (this section also expressly provides the option of jury trial for damage suits).
103. See CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 54, § 8(b).
[Vol. VII
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compensatory and punitive damages as remedies for violations'0 while
title VII has no such similar provision.1' A grievant may only obtain
equitable reliefs such as an injunction and/or back pay.' Under current
law, a black woman who is harassed on the job because of her race would
be able to obtain damages under § 1981, yet unless a remedy is provided
under title VII, the same woman would obtain no relief if the basis for the
harassment were sex.' The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 would
change this obvious oversight.
Section 8 of the proposed legislation also provides a partial
solution to the Supreme Court's decision last term in Jett v. Dallas
Independent School District,1 in which the Court held that local
governments cannot be held liable for their employee's violations of § 1981
under a respondent superior theory because the statute does not provide an
independent federal damages remedy for racial discrimination by local
governmental entities.'l Instead, the court held that only the remedies
available under § 1983, requiring that the discrimination by the local or
state government be the product of official governmental policy, are
available in the context of § 1981 actions against state actors.110
While Jett applies to all contractual relationships in which race.
discrimination occurs, this section of the proposed Act, as part of an
employment law bill, addresses the problem in the context of title VIL11
Consequently, the proposed amendment would subject state employers to
compensatory damages under a theory of respondent superior for
employment discrimination."' The proposed language not only addresses
Jett but also expands the basis for employers' liability for damages under
title VII. 3 Prior to Jett, under § 1981, state employers were liable for
104. 42 U.S.C. § 1981. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
105. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g). See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
106. Id.
107. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g).
108. 109 S. Ct. 2702 (1989).
109. Id. at 2720. Section 1981 provides only that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall have the same right... 'to make and enforce contracts, to sue,
be parties, give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens .... " 42 U.S.C. 9
1981.
110. Jeft, 109 S. Ct. at 2720.
111. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 8.
112. Id.
113. Id.
With respect to an unlawful employment practice
(other than an unlawful employment practice
established in accordance with section 703(k))..
Symp. 1990]
JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS
employees' violations of § 1981 under a respondent superior theory while
under title VII employers' basis for liability exceeds the scope of respondent
superior, under certain circumstances." 4 Therefore, to the extent the
proposed language does not address the theory of an employer's liability,
the courts are free to construe its provisions to expand the basis of an
employers' liability beyond vicarious liability.
F. The Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., "Fix"
Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.,"' served as the primary
impetus for § 7 of the bill. In that case, the Supreme Court denied
plaintiffs, who were female employees, the right to claim discrimination in
a seniority plan."6 The plaintiffs alleged that, even though the plan was
facially neutral, it had been conceived to discriminate against women."7
Although the plaintiffs were not adversely affected by the plan until 1982,
the Court concluded that they were required to file charges with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, a prerequisite to bringing civil suit,
within 180 days of the adoption of the plan in 1979." In essence, the
Court required the employees to anticipate and initiate suit to prevent
future adverse applications of the system no matter how speculative or
unlikely that application might be."9 The decision insulates employers
from liability for facially neutral seniority systems that have discriminatory
effects subsequent to their implementation.
Section 7 of the bill replaces the term "occurred" in § 706(e),
. (A) compensatory damages may be awarded;
and (B) if the respondent (other than a
government, government agency, or a political
subdivision) engaged in the unlawful employment
practice with malice, or with reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of
others, punitive damages may be awarded against
such respondent ....
Id. See also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1981; 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. See Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc.,
830 F.2d 1554, 1564 n.22 (11th Cir. 1987) (employer strictly liable for an employee's quid
pro quo sexual harassment); id. at 1559-60 (employer liable under hostile work
environment theory based on employee's use of apparent authority to harass co-worker).
115. 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
116. Id. at 2268-69.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 2267-68.
119. Id. at 2270 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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describing unlawful employment practices, with the terms "has occurred,
or has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved, whichever is
later.""z This section would also extend the current statute of limitations
from six months to two years in order to conform with the statutes of
limitations for charges filed either initially with state and local agencies or
directly with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission."' The
section further provides that
[w]here a seniority system, or seniority practice is part of
a collective bargaining agreement and was included in
such agreement with the intent to discriminate on [a
prohibited basis].... the application of such a system or
practice during the period that the collective bargaining
agreement is in effect shall be an unlawful employment
practice."2
This provision is intended to reverse the Lorance decision by redefining
"occurred" to include "affect adversely" signalling that the statute of
limitations does not run until the concrete effects of the injury are felt by
the charging party. 23
Another effect of § 7 will be to extend the statute of limitations
period under title VII to coincide more closely with those under other
employment laws.'U For example, the Equal Pay Act of 1963,25 which
has the same statute of limitations as the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938,6 provides a two year statute of limitations for a violation, three,
if willful. 7 Claims arising under the Reconstruction Era Statutes2 are
generally subject to state statutes of limitations, ranging generally from one
to three or more years.12 title VII's existing statute of limitations, while
intended to encourage prompt resolution of discrimination, has, in practice,
hampered such resolutions, prohibiting potentially meritorious claims
120. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 7.
121. Id. § 7.
122. Id. § 7.
123. Id. § 7. See generally Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261
(1989).
124. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 7. See also infra notes 125-30 and
accompanying text.
125. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1988).
126. Id. §§ 201-219.
127. Id. § 206(d).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1983, 1985-1986, 1988.
129. See generally id. at § 1981.
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because of untimeliness. 13°
IV. THE RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS LAWS
Section 11 of the bill is designed to send a very explicit message
to the Supreme Court. It provides, in pertinent part:
(a) EFFECTUATION OF PURPOSE -- All
Federal laws protecting the civil rights of persons shall be
broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of such laws
to eliminate discrimination and provide effective remedies.
(b) NONLIMITATION -- Except as expressly
provided, no Federal law protecting the civil rights of
persons shall be construed to restrict or limit the rights,
procedures, or remedies available under any other Federal
law protecting such civil rights.13'
This language is intended to restore generally accepted rules of statutory
construction which require the courts to liberally construe federal civil
rights laws and to avoid restricting or limiting rights under other existing
civil rights laws unless that law otherwise so expressly provides.'32 This
has been a problem for the past decade and a half as the Supreme Court,
and to some extent the lower courts, have begun to depart from the
generally accepted rule of statutory construction that civil rights statutes
are to be interpreted broadly to effectuate their underlying purposes.33
As a result, Congress has repeatedly had to amend these laws to achieve
the same result as would have been achieved under a broad statutory rule
of construction.1 34
Last term's decisions were no exception to the Court's trend of
unsettling traditional statutory construction and may indicate even further
erosion.1 31 For example, in Patterson, where the Court held that 42
130. Id. § 2000e.
131. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 11.
132. Id. § 2(b). The language of the subsection is inspired by a comparable provision
of § 3 of the Handicapped Children's Protection Act of 1986. See Handicapped Children's
Protection Act, supra note 25, § 3 (codified at 20 U.S.C. 0 1415(f) (1988)).
133. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7, § 2(a).
134. Remedying this recurring problem has been costly. Congress has had to expend
massive amounts of time and resources to address problems previously addressed, and to
reinstate rights that had been suspended between the time of the Supreme Court decisions
and Congress' response. See supra notes 10-32 and accompanying text.
135. See supra notes 40-130 and accompanying text.
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U.S.C. § 1981 generally did not address discrimination in the execution of
and compliance with contracts; the Court expressly insisted that it would
be undesirable "to read [§ 1981] broadly."1" Moreover, the Court made
no effort to consider whether its proposed interpretation of § 1981 would
advance or defeat congressional purpose. Lorance, as discussed previously,
provides an additional example of the Court's departure from established
rules of statutory interpretation. 37 There the Court held that the
plaintiffs, challengers of an allegedly discriminatory seniority system, had
to sue within 300 days of the adoption of the system rather than when the
system adversely affected them, years after the adoption.' The majority,
in Lorance, conceded that its broad construction of the exception to title
VII for seniority systems was not required by the statute's language nor
was its interpretation the most natural reading of the statute.' "
Nowhere in its opinion did the majority rely on or refer to the purposes of
title VII.
In order to counteract this alarming trend subsection (a) of the
proposed section would restore the liberal rule of construction.'' When
a statute's terms may be construed in several ways this section mandates
that courts shall select the construction which most effectively advances the
congressional purposes underlying the law.'41 Subsection (b) is intended
to restore the rule of construction that civil rights statutes should be
construed in light of "a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping
remedies against discrimination." 42  The Court, most recently in
Patterson, has failed to apply this rule and instead regarded the relationship
between civil rights laws § 1981 and title VII as exclusive, opting to
"preserve the integrity of Title VII's procedures" by abolishing, for most
victims of employment discrimination, the greater substantive remedies
under § 1981.'
V. THE CHANGES FOR SUCCESS
Predicting the future is always a very dangerous proposition.
Nevertheless, I believe that we can be reasonably optimistic about the
chances of eventual success for the laws proposed in the Civil Rights Act
136. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2375 (1989).
137. Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc., 109 S. Ct. 2261 (1989).
138. Id. at 2268-69.
139. Id. at 2265-66.
140. Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 9, § 11(a).
141. Id. at § 11(b).
142. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
143. Patterson, 109 S. Ct. at 2375.
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of 1990. The Act was introduced to Congress in February of 1990 and has
enjoyed significant bi-partisan support in both Houses.' At the time of
this Symposium, the bill had passed the Senate Committee on Labor and
Human Relations without major or weakening amendments. 4 ' On
October 16, 1990, the bill passed in the Senate by a 62 to 34 vote' and
on October 17, 1990, the House approved the bill by a 273 to 154 vote.147
However, President Bush continues to threaten to veto the bill.'" This
legislation, nonetheless, sends a strong, unmistakable, and very necessary
message to the courts, in particular the Supreme Court, that the majority
of Congress, if not the Court or the Administration, is determined to
address forcefully the continuing problem of discrimination on the basis of
race, sex, national origin and religion.
144. Efforts at Compromise on Civil Rights Bill Fail to Produce Agreement, Daily
Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 194, at A-12. See also Civil Rights Act of 1990, supra note 7.
145. Id.
146. Berke, Senate Passes Rights Bill, but Vote Is Not Enough to Override Veto,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1990, at A25, col. 1.
147. Rosenthal, House Passes Rights Bill on Job Bias; White House Vows Veto,
N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1990, at D25, col. 2.
148. A Veto Mr. Bush Can Still Avoid, N.Y. Times, Oct. 1, 1990, at A20, col. 1.
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